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Brotvn Journal of World Affairs: What was your opinion about the Paul Wolfowitz
appointment to the World Bank presidency? Has your opinion changed since your
initial reaction?
Joseph Stiglitz: My major concern was always the procedure for appointing the presi-
dent. These are supposed to be international economic institutions—mttrnztionsXpublic
institutions—and particularly since the issue of governance is so high on the agenda,
for them to exhibit such a democratic deficit—where they don't ask who's the most
qualified person regardless of nationality, race, religion, or gender—is really a very big
mistake. Instead they accept-wYvo the president of the United States thinks should be the
Bank's president. The way the president is chosen undermines the ability of the Bank to
achieve the objectives of the institution and particularly its legitimacy in dealing with
issues of governance, on which it has placed such emphasis in recent years.
Journal', In your book Making Globalization Work, it seems like your main opposition
to Wolfowitz is that his appointment symbolizes U.S. hegemony.
Stiglitz: It's not only that; the appointment also symbolizes the democratic deficit
which critics of the Bank point to as one of its major failings.
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Journal: Why is that symbolism so important?
Stiglitz: One of the issues in the global debate over this important global institution
is, to what extent the Bank is a multilateral institution and to what extent it is a hand-
maiden of the United States. To the extent that it's viewed by the rest of the world as
a handmaiden of the United States, its effectiveness is undermined. The way that the
president is chosen naturally raises worries that the Bank will act as the United States'
handmaiden. These concerns could be obviated, at least to some extent, if the United
States were to appoint the president in a spirit of collaboration, after extensive consul-
tations with other countries. In the case of the appointment of the current president,
the discussions that did occur were held behind closed doors; given the unpopularity
of the war in Iraq, there was extensive opposition to his appointment. Even the idea
caused dismay; many in the rest of world were incredulous that the G-8 went along.
To those in the developing world, it seemed another example of the rich "old boys
club" imposing their will. The hypocrisy between the good governance which these
countries preached and the bad governance which they practiced was disturbing. Even
then, however, all might have been forgiven if, after Wolfowitz's election, the Bank had
been run in a collaborative way. Previous presidents had gone out of their way to make
sure that their immediate advisors represented a diversity of countries, with a diversity
of viewpoints. Wolfowitz, on the other hand, has been accused by those in the Bank
of surrounding himself with Americans posessing little or no development experience,
drawn from the same narrow conservative Republican pool with which Wolfowitz was
associated. Unhappiness in the Bank's professional staff, one of the institution's real
assets, grew to the point that there was a large exodus of senior people. Confidence
in Wolfowitz's presidency was so low that the Bank's board even took a critical stance
on his corruption program—in spite of their broad commitment in this area. There is
considerable debate in many European countries about whether they should cut back
their financial support to the World Bank because of their lack of confidence.
Journal: How would you see that process becoming more democratic? You could say
that Wolfowitz's past doesn't speak very well to transparency, but he is a big advocate
of spreading democracy.
Stiglitz: Being an advocate of democracy requires the practice of democracy. Part of
democracy, in my mind at least, is compliance with the international rule of law, and
the invasion of Iraq by the United States was against international law—a position that
even the attorney general of the United Kingdom has taken.
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Journal'. Do you have any suggestions about how the institution could democratize
the process of choosing its president?
Stiglitz: It would be easy to reform the process. The Bank should begin by specifying
the qualities it wants, and follow that with a global search for the most qualified person.
There are a large number of highly qualified people, and among them are several from
developing countries. Such individuals obviously have an advantage in understanding
problems with development, having lived there all their lives. I could quickly name
several first-rate economists from countries like Brazil and Turkey: people who have
been in their governments, who understand democratic political processes, and who
have strong commitments to democracy. It is important, of course, to have an open
and transparent process, a clear indication of criteria, and a wider participation in the
selection process. But I can't think of a worse situation than where there is an old boy's
agreement that whoever the U.S. president picks will be appointed. At this point, our
concern should not be with finding a perfect selection process, but a better selection
process. This should be easy, because there is just so much room for improvement.
Journal'. Now that Wolfowitz is president, what are your views on the anticorruption
efforts that are being initiated under the new presidency? They would improve the ef-
fectiveness of loans and in some cases, at least according to some of Wolfowitz's speeches,
mitigate inefficient, even harmfiil uses of World Bank fiinds.
Stiglitz: I have not been able to study whether in fact there have been improvements in
management of the quality of the loans. What really matters is development effective-
ness, and it's very difficult to check that in a one-year horizon. The general consensus
is that corruption is an important issue, one which Jim Wolfensohn and I put on the
agenda.
What are the most effective ways of fighting corruption? I believe you have to have
a comprehensive approach to fighting corruption. It's important for the World Bank
to take a strong stance against the secret bank accounts used by dictators to hide their
money. The Bush administration vetoed the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development] initiative to reduce bank secrecy. I think it's important to
push the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which seeks greater transparency
both in the transfer of funds from oil and mining companies to governments and in
how governments use those funds as central to the fight against corruption. There is,
in fact, a broad agenda for fighting corruption, which I spell out in my book Making
Globalization Work. Procurement practices are another example of an area in which
reforms are essential for fighting corruption. The Bank's own competitive procurement
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policies and practices, though almost surely not perfect, are exemplary. Regrettably,
the U.S. Defense Department has not been setting a good example: the single-source
contracting that the United States is implementing in the context of Iraq is in fact an
example ofthe kind of bad procurement policy that the Bank and its president should
be criticizing.
Four further points: First, when you see corruption, what do you do? Do you cut
the country's aid, or are there ways of delivering aid that are immune or at least resistant
to corruption—for instance, giving money to good NGOs? Bangladesh is an example
of a country where there are very effective NGOs despite a corrupt government. The
goal should be to find ways of delivering the aid to countries with already corrupt and
often dictatorial governments.
Second, there is a lot of worry that the anticorruption agenda won't be uniformly
applied. The World Bank is discussing going into Iraq, a country rife with corruption.
There's worry among many countries that the Bank will say Iraq is an exception. The
worry is that there is corruption in the corruption agenda; and that corruption will be
used as an excuse for cutting oflFaid for countries that the United States wants to punish,
while corruption in countries that the U.S. wishes to reward will be overlooked.
Third, corruption takes many forms. Campaign contribution corruption is just as
eviscerating as overt corruption. Campaign contributions can be used to "buy" legisla-
tion that, for instance, puts no restrictions on drug prices or that restricts accessibility
to generic medicines, and it can have very adverse effects on both the government's
budget and on developing countries.
Fourth, there must be "due process." It is not uncommon for parties to fling ac-
cusations of corruption against their rivals. Often those accusations have some validity;
sometimes, however, they do not. In democratic societies, one is innocent until proven
guilty. The Bank has flung accusations of corruption against a number of countries,
but there are accusations that the Bank has not respected due process before cutting
off loans. In at least one case, when the country asked for evidence—so that it could
prosecute the oflFenders and set up safeguards to ensure that such abuses do not occur
in the future—the Bank was slow to produce the evidence, and further questions were
raised about whether the evidence would stand up in a court of law. Such accusations
against the Bank need to be taken very seriously, and I hope the Bank's board looks
carefully into them. (Again, recent history colors some of this debate. The United States
has not followed due process in Iraq, for example, with respect to what it calls enemy
combatants; its position on torture is almost surely in contravention of the Conven-
tion on Torture.)
Corruption also needs to be seen within a broad economic agenda and within the
context of development effectiveness. One can be non-corrupt but not effective.
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Joumak So the intention is right, but the approach and the practical application are
wrong?
Stiglitz: I think the fight against corruption needs to be set within a broader, more
comprehensive development agenda, and it has to be taken on much more compre-
hensively. Corruption is a very difficult problem, and it affects all countries.
Joumak Another argument that you have made in the past is that the system of loans
is untenable because, as the debt accumulates, there is no way that these countries can
pay the money back.
Stiglitz: That's right. Some of the loans are for projects like electricity that are income-
generating, giving rise to revenues that enable the loans to be repaid; but many of them
are not.
Joumah If the corruption campaign were to reduce the inefficiencies in fund alloca-
tions such that the only people who get loans use them correctly for growth, would be
campaign be a possible way to solve the problem of loan tenability?
00
Stiglitz: If the country grows more, it is in a better position to pay back the loans,
but it still may be very difficult. Remember, the government has to impose taxes, so
the economy could be growing, but it still may be difficult for the government to ap-
propriate the returns of the investments in, say, education or health. So that's why I
made the distinction. If the government is investing in education, it's going to be 25
years before those young people are productive members of the labor force. There can
be high long-run returns, but even long-term World Bank loans have to be paid back
within 18 years.
Joumak Do you think that the World Bank should generally consider moving from
loans to grants?
Stiglitz: I think the Bank should make more use of grants than it has in the past. I do
think it's important that they move to grants and that there be additional funding, so
that the flow of funds can be sustained.
Journal: How else would you recommend reforming internationai financial institu-
tions?
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Stigiitz: There are reforms in the governance, such as voting rights or more transparency;
reforms can also be in basic procedures that reduce the scope for conflicts of interest
(for example, reforms that would reduce the scope for "revolving door" employment,
where individuals move, for instance, between the IMF and the international private
banks that its lending programs may have bailed out—policies in the Bank and the
Fund are not, I think, up to the best practices followed in democracies). And then
there could be reform in their operations, making forecasts of, for instance, the impact
of programs not only on infiation but also on unemployment, and then holding the
Bank or the IMF accountable when their forecasts turn out wrong, and finding out
what went wrong.
There have to be improvements in accountability. When the International
Monetary Fund says, "This policy is going to work," they should give a forecast of the
magnitude of unemployment, and if they are wrong, they should be asked why their
forecasts and consequences were wrong.
And finally, in the case of the IMF, there needs to be more focus on their core
mission. Just last September, they began focusing on the problems of global imbalances,
but these problems of global imbalances are what they should have been focusing on
for a very long time. I think there's a broad consensus on this. Rather than focusing
on development and other things beyond their expertise, they should be focusing on
global financial stability. In fact, not only have they failed to address the underlying
problems of global financial instability; they have probably contributed to global fi-
nancial instability.
Joumak You often express the importance of political context for the Bank, such as
with democratic policies. But then you also criticize conditionality-laden loans. Is there
a problem in doing that? Wouldn't conditionality be necessary to create the political
context in which these institutions could work?
Stiglitz; There are several related issues. One is the nature of the conditionality. If you're
lending money, you want to make sure the money is well-spent. So if you give money
towards a project in a factory, you want to make sure it doesn't go into a vacation. So
yes, you need to have some conditionality, but the real question is in its nature: Is it
political? Do the economic conditions make sense? Are they related to the loan? Is there
evidence that the conditions will make the loan more effective? The evidence exists
to the contrary—that the conditions have not typically been related to increasing the
effectiveness of the lending. In some cases, when the IMF has imposed over a hundred
conditions, they actually impede development effisctiveness.
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foumah In a recent book chapter on ethics and globalization, you argued that eco-
nomic advice should be informed by ethical standards. Do you think that an ethical
approach should be institutionalized, or should it be cultivated outside and brought
into the institutions by the individuals who work there?
Stiglitz: The foundations of any ethical stance are going to lie with individuals within
the organization, so an understanding of ethical principles has to be more widely
inculcated. The real question is: are there ways that the institutions can help facilitate
behavior, which one might say are in accord with ethical principles? And the answer
is yes. Some companies and international institutions have tried to talk about ethics,
corporate social responsibility, or ethical globalization and to incorporate ethical val-
ues in corporate practices. I think it is fairly clear that there are ways in which these
practices can be facilitated.
We can help individuals (and organizations) think about issues like conflicts of
interest, the impact of actions on others, and honesty. People may give various inter-
pretations and weights to various ethical principals, but increasing awareness of these
is important for institutions both in the public and private sector. In my book Roar-
ing Nineties, I suggest that many of the United States' CEOs were guilty of unethical
behavior during the heyday of the "roaring nineties." In the end, after having been
exposed to discussions of ethical principles, maybe the CEOs who were stealing from the
corporations for whom they were working might have said, "Well, it's justified because
I've done so much for the corporation." But had there been more ethical discussions,
maybe some of them would have thought twice about what they were doing.
Joumah Seeing as the 2002 fast-track legislation will probably run out in a half-year or
so, what does the failure ofthe Doha Round mean for development and international
trade in general?
Stiglitz: First, you have to recognize that, by December 2005, ambitions had been so
curtailed that even if there had been a "successful completion" to the Doha Round, it
would have not been a true development round. It would not have had much impact
on most developing countries: it would have been a charade. One of the dangers was
that, because it was called the development round, there would be a widespread percep-
tion that development had been dealt with; and having dealt with development, trade
negotiators could carry on, as they had before Doha (the previous trade round was so
unfair that the poorest developing countries were actually made worse off).
There's a sense in which what happens now is of relatively little concern to the
developing countries, except for one thing which has just changed. The push by the
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Bush administration for bilateral trade agreements may result in an international trade
regime which is even worse than that which would have emerged from the successful
completion of the Doha round (assuming from where the development round has been
going). For the most part, these bilateral agreements have been adverse to the interests of
developing countries: they reduce access to generic medicines and undermine the whole
global trading system. The patchwork of bilateral agreements is resulting in an inter-
national trade regime which is bad for both developed and developing countries. With
the Democrats back in control of Congress, I think this particular strategy is not likely
to have much success. The proliferation of bilateral agreements is the major threat from
the failure of the Doha Round, and I think that threat is now contained—although it
has not disappeared because there still is a possibility that Europe and Japan may pursue
these bilateral trade agreements. But at least their scope will be markedly less than it
would have been if the Republicans had stayed in control of Congress. ®
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